When I first started Proctor in Admiralty, I promised myself
that I would post at least three times per week. That lasted about two weeks and then life got
in the way as it so often does. But now
I am back and I will try much harder to make this a good resource for maritime
and technology information. I don’t
expect that I can match Dennis Bryant, and his daily Maritime Items on mainly
governmental/maritime issues, but I will do my best to keep all of those interested, apprised
of developments mainly in technology affecting the practice of maritime law and
in the maritime industry.
So, what kind of a maritime law blogger would I be if I did
not cover the Supreme Court's recent decision in Stewart v. Dutra. Stewart was a marine engineer, who was
injured aboard a dredge while working for the Dutra Construction Company. Dutra, was in the process of digging a trench
in Boston Harbor using Dutra’s Super Scoop, “the world’s largest dredge”.
Stewart
sued Dutra pursuant to the "Jones Act", 46 U.S.C. § 688 (a), which
allows “any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment” to sue the employer for negligence and under §5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U. S. C. §905(b), which authorizes
covered employees to sue a “vessel” owner as a third party for an injury caused
by the owner’s negligence. The District Court granted Dutra summary judgment on
the Jones Act claim, and the First Circuit affirmed. On remand, the District
Court granted Dutra summary judgment on the LHWCA claim. In affirming, the
First Circuit noted that Dutra had conceded that the dredge was a
“vessel” under §905(b), but found that Dutra’s alleged negligence had been
committed in its capacity as an employer and not as the vessel’s owner. The
Supreme Court had previously held that to qualify for “seaman” status under the
Jones Act, a worker must have an “employment-related connection to a vessel in
navigation.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995). The First Circuit relied on its definition of
“vessel” in DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros, 959 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1992)
(en banc) and thus excluding the dredge from the category of a "vessel in
navigation" for purposes of the Jones Act.
The
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held that term “vessel”, for the
purposes of both the LHWCA and Jones Act, is defined at 1 USC §3 and includes
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.
This is a very broad definition and encompasses almost anything that can float. So now we just need to
wait for the first case of a power boat pulled inflatable tube "vessel"
accident!
